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The main purpose of this paper is to shed light on Pierre Bourdieu’s conception of 
language. Although he has dedicated a significant part of his work to the study of 
language and even though his analysis of language has been extensively discussed in 
the literature, almost no attention has been paid to the fact that Bourdieu’s account 
of language is based on a number of ontological presuppositions, that is, on a set of 
universal assumptions about the very nature of language. This article aims to fill this 
gap in the literature by offering a detailed overview of 10 key features which, from a 
Bourdieusian point of view, can be regarded as inherent in language. On the basis of 
this enquiry, the study seeks to demonstrate that——contrary to common belief——there 
is not only a Bourdieusian sociology of language but also a Bourdieusian philosophy 
of language, which provides a useful theoretical framework for examining the 
unavoidable conditions of the real speech situation. The paper draws to a close by 
reflecting on the flaws and limitations of Bourdieu’s approach to language. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Introduction 
The main purpose of this paper is to shed light on Pierre Bourdieu’s conception 
of language. On various occasions, Bourdieu distances himself from what he 
considers to be “transcendental”, “idealistic” and “scholastic” accounts of language. 
In opposition to Habermas’s communication-theoretic approach, for example, 
Bourdieu claims that language almost never functions as a mere instrument of 
communication (Bourdieu 1982f, 60). On the contrary, given that the production 
of communicative relations is inconceivable without the reproduction of power 
relations, the meaning-bearing construction of linguisticality cannot be dissociated 
from the interest-laden constitution of society. In other words, our communicative 
orientation towards mutual comprehension is impregnated with our purposive 
immersion in mutual competition. If linguistic power is a matter of social power, 
every rationally raised “validity claim” can be regarded as a relationally determined 
“legitimacy claim”. Examining both the philosophical and the sociological implica- 
tions of this perspective, this paper makes a case for the view that we need to 
identify the unavoidable conditions of the real speech situation, rather than the 
avoidable conditions of the ideal speech situation, in order to understand that the 
legitimacy of linguistic validity is always contingent upon the validity of social 
legitimacy. 
The question remains, however, what the unavoidable conditions of the real 
speech situation are and to what extent a Bourdieusian framework permits us to 
identify, and make sense of, the various——relationally defined——conditions of lin- 
guistic communication. Before embarking upon a detailed examination of the 
unavoidable conditions of the real speech situation, it is worth pointing out the 
following: although he has dedicated a significant part of his work to the study of 
language1 and even though his analysis of language has been extensively discussed 
in the literature2, almost no attention has been paid to the fact that Bourdieu’s 
account of language is based on a number of ontological presuppositions, that is, 
on a set of universal assumptions about the very nature of language. One can spec- 
ulate about the reasons for this omission in the literature, but, whatever conclusion 
one may reach, three reasons appear to be particularly important in this regard: 
(a) Given that Bourdieu is explicitly opposed to what he considers to be merely the- 
oretical——that is, “transcendental”, “idealistic” and “scholastic”——accounts of 
language3, it seems that, whilst it is right to point out that there is a Bourdieu- 
sian study of language, it would be a contradiction in terms to affirm that there 
is such a thing as a Bourdieusian theory of language. 
(b) Since Bourdieu——as a philosophe by training and a sociologue by choice4——is 
primarily concerned with the empirical, rather than the transcendental, condi- 
tions of linguistic communication, it seems that, whilst it is appropriate to 
assume that there is a Bourdieusian sociology of language, it would be 
mistaken to suggest that there is such a thing as a Bourdieusian philosophy of 
language. 
 
  
 
(c) In light of the fact that, according to Bourdieu, language constitutes only one 
amongst other social dimensions and the linguistic field only one amongst 
other social fields5, it seems that, whilst it is sensible to acknowledge that there 
is a Bourdieusian social-theoretic approach to language, it would be unjustified 
to characterize Bourdieusian sociology as a language-theoretic approach to the 
social. 
Nevertheless, as shall be demonstrated in the following sections, Bourdieu does 
identify a number of transcendental features of language, he does provide us with 
philosophical tools to understand the nature of language, and he does conceive of 
language as a fundamental, albeit not necessarily foundational, element of social 
life. If this holds true, then a strong case can be made that——contrary to common 
belief——there is not only a Bourdieusian theory of language, but also a Bourdieu- 
sian philosophy of language. Yet, taking into consideration Bourdieu’s field-plural- 
istic conception of society and his emphatic rejection of communication-theoretic 
approaches to the social, there is little doubt that it would be erroneous to assert 
that Bourdieu puts forward a language-theoretic approach to the social. With the 
aim of illustrating that Bourdieu’s account of language is based on a number of 
ontological presuppositions, the following analysis shall examine 10 key features 
that can——and, from a Bourdieusian perspective, indeed should——be regarded as 
inherent in language. 
 
1. The Sociality of  Language 
The most fundamental feature of language is that it is social. To be more precise, 
language is both a socially constructed and a socially embedded force of human 
action: as a socially constructed force, its existence is contingent upon the collective 
production of linguistic utterances; as a socially embedded force, its existence is 
dependent upon the collective framing of linguistic utterances. Insofar as language 
is collectively produced, it is socially constructed through processes of human inter- 
action; insofar as language is collectively framed, it is socially embedded in contexts 
of human interaction. 
If we regard language as a constitutive component of both the processual and 
the contextual nature of social reality, then we are obliged to recognize the explana- 
tory limitations of “‘pure’ linguistics” (Bourdieu 1982f, 72; Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992c, 141), that is, of transcendentalist approaches to language which 
fail to account for the intrinsic sociality of human linguisticality. Just as we need to 
give up “the ambition of absolute knowledge” (Bourdieu 1982b, 23, italics added)6 
based on “the illusion of a detached and rootless intelligentsia” (Bourdieu 1982b, 23, 
italics added)7, we need to renounce the belief in the possibility of absolute linguisti- 
cality derived from the transcendental power of a removed and footless intelligibility, 
since our “linguistic capacity”8 is a “social capacity”9, that is, a competence that is 
acquired and developed in relation to a social environment. If we examine both the 
“social factors”10 producing a seemingly universal linguistic ontology and  the 
 
  
 
“social value”11 generating a relatively arbitrary linguistic hierarchy, then we are 
able to decipher the underlying sociality of human linguisticality. 
To be sure, there is no linguistic ontology without a “linguistic community”12, 
and there is no linguistic hierarchy without a stratified society. For the expressive 
power of linguistic representations cannot be separated from the coercive power of 
social relations. Every linguistic ontology is constructed through the social relations 
established between members of a linguistic community. Inasmuch as “language is 
an integral part of” (Thompson 1992, 1) and “plays a basic role in much of social 
life” (Hanks 1993, 139), social life is an integral part of and plays a basic role in 
much of language. In short, both the linguisticality of sociality and the sociality of 
linguisticality lie at the heart of the meaning-bearing construction of humanity. 
 
2. The Dialecticality of Language 
Another essential feature of language is that it is dialectically produced and repro- 
duced. From a Bourdieusian perspective, the dialectical nature of language operates 
on three main levels: first, on the level of competence and performance; second, on 
the level of grammar and pragmatics; and, third, on the level of commonality and 
singularity. 
First, on the level of competence and performance, language owes its existence to 
subjects who are both in principle and in practice capable of speech and action. To 
be in principle capable of speech and action means to be equipped with the “com- 
petence” of engaging in linguistically mediated forms of interaction (see Thompson 
1992, 4–5). To be in practice capable of speech and action means to be prone to 
the “performance” of engaging in linguistically mediated forms of interaction (see 
Thompson 1992, 4–5). Although the methodological distinction between “compe- 
tence” and “performance” convincingly captures the ontological difference between 
the background potentiality of language and the foreground performativity of 
speech, it is crucial to recognize the intrinsic interdependence of linguistic compe- 
tence and linguistic performance: a speaker needs to be able to generate speech 
acts to become a member of a speech community. Linguistic competence, however, 
is reflected not only in “the capacity to generate an unlimited sequence of gram- 
matically well-formed sentences” (Ledeneva 1994, 8), but also in “a capacity to 
produce expressions which are appropriate for particular situations” (Ledeneva 
1994, 8). Thus, our sens linguistique is a sens pratique which enables us to produce 
situated language games in relation to situating life forms. The reflexive power of 
speech cannot be divorced from the immersive power of context. 
Second, on the level of grammar and pragmatics, language owes its existence to 
both symbolic structures and symbolic processes. As emphasized in Saussurian 
thought, language emanates from the continuous interplay between langue and 
parole.13 Indeed, the dialectics of grammaticality and praxeology can be regarded 
as the backbone of linguisticality: linguistic practices are embedded in grammatical 
frameworks. Our linguistic involvement in communicative processes is conceivable 
only as the combination of language-based speech and speech-based language: our 
 
  
 
speech is language-based in that it takes place within grammatically defined frame- 
works of rules and conventions, and our language is speech-based in that it is 
employed within pragmatically established situations of encounters and interac- 
tions. To the extent that langue forms the legislative framework that makes com- 
munication possible by establishing a set of formal rules inherent in a particular 
language, parole constitutes the executive process that makes communication pos- 
sible by applying the immanent rules of a particular language. Hence, language can 
be conceived of as both an opus operatum and a modus operandi (Bourdieu 1982c, 
8). As an opus operatum, the grammaticality of linguisticality imposes itself upon 
the situated trajectory of human determinacy; as a modus operandi, the praxeology 
of linguisticality is impregnated with the assembled teleology of human agency. 
Put differently, language is a set of “structuring structures” and “structured struc- 
tures” (Bourdieu [1977] 1992, 165; see also Grenfell and James 1998, 74). As a set 
of——grammatically organized——structuring structures, it shapes our symbolic 
interactions; as a set of——pragmatically mobilized——structured structures, it is 
shaped by our symbolic interactions. 
Third, on the level of commonality and singularity, language owes its existence 
to both shared points of cultural reference and unique sources of lived experience. 
In fact, the very possibility of linguisticality rests on a curious paradox: “[t]he 
paradox of communication is that it presupposes a common medium, but one 
which works——as is clearly seen in the limiting case in which, as often in poetry, 
the aim is to transmit emotions——only by eliciting and reviving singular, and 
therefore socially marked, experiences” (Bourdieu 1982d, 16, italics added).14 In 
other words, language is infused with the paradoxical relationship between com- 
monality and singularity, ordinariness and uniqueness, sociality and individuality. 
As an intersubjectively externalized generator of symbolically mediated interaction, 
language is both a source and a medium of collective identity; as a subjectively 
internalized generator of symbolically mediated interaction, language is both a 
source and a medium of individual identity. The commonality of human language, 
which allows for the intersubjectively negotiated signification of the world, is 
intimately intertwined with the singularity of human experience, which is due to 
the subjectively filtered absorption of the world. 
 
3. The Signifiability of Language 
A further remarkable feature of language is that it is a——if not, the most——crucial 
source of human signification, that is, of our ability to attach meaning to the world 
by which we find ourselves surrounded. The meaning-laden nature of language 
contains six key dimensions. First, as meaning-creating entities, we produce mean- 
ing “about” the world: the creation of meaning is a constitutive component of the 
symbolic production of society. Second, as meaning-projecting entities, we attribute 
meaning “to” the world: the projection of meaning is pivotal to the symbolic orga- 
nization of society. Third, as meaning-perceiving entities, we absorb meaning 
“from” the world: the perception of meaning is a sine qua non of the symbolic 
 
  
 
internalization of society. Fourth, as meaning-interpreting entities, we process 
meaning “beyond” the world: the interpretation of meaning is vital to the symbolic 
subjectivization of society. Fifth, as meaning-reciprocating entities, we exchange 
meaning “with” the world: the reciprocation of meaning is the driving force of the 
symbolic ritualization of society. Finally, as meaning-fusing entities, we merge 
meaning “through” the world: the fusion of meaning lies at the heart of the 
symbolic unification of society.15 
A language, then, is inevitably a view of the world, a vision du monde, a Welt- 
anschauung (see Bourdieu and Delsaut 1981, 3), for it makes us see certain things 
and not see other things, and——more importantly——it permits us to see some 
things and precludes us from seeing other things in a particular way. Indeed, our 
view of the world is inextricably linked to our language about the world: linguisti- 
cally mediated “schemes of perception and appreciation” (Bourdieu 1982d, 16)16 
are socially powerful frameworks of reflection and action. Language constitutes a 
“house of meaning” situated within, rather than detached from, the “house of 
being”: our search for intelligibility is symptomatic of our existential dependence 
on society. We see what language lets us see, and language sees what society lets it 
see. Linguistic conceptions of reality can never escape the societal determinacy of 
symbolically mediated interactionality. Despite the undeniable weight of the socie- 
tal determinacy which permeates the most abstract forms of human linguisticality, 
it is essential not to underestimate the relative autonomy of linguistic signifiability: 
language is an irreducible component of the social world, just as the social world 
is an irreducible component of language. “[A]gents endowed with schemes of 
perception and appreciation” (Bourdieu 1982d, 16)17 are subjects equipped with 
collectively constructed and individually internalized frameworks of reflection and 
action. “To speak is inevitably to situate oneself in the world” (Hanks 1993, 139) 
and to situate oneself in the social world means to immerse oneself in a cultural 
realm imbued with the signifying power of linguistic meaning. Just as “[p]eople 
construct the social world using language” (Hanks 1993, 139), language constructs 
the social world using people. The meaning-giving production of linguisticality is 
the precondition for the meaning-bearing reproduction of society. 
 
4. The Doxicality of Language 
Another noteworthy feature of language is that it is doxic: to establish a linguistic 
relation to reality requires imposing symbolically mediated background assump- 
tions upon the world.18 As linguistic beings, we are, by definition, prejudgmental 
entities, for we cannot escape the presuppositional power of the interpretive back- 
grounds which lurk behind our performative foregrounds. Even if we bring the 
interpretive background of a doxic relation to the world to the performative fore- 
ground of a discursive reflection upon the world, we cannot escape the ubiquity of 
doxicality which permeates the universe of linguisticality. To be submerged in lan- 
guage means to be immersed in prejudice, because all our foreground utterances 
are embedded in background traditions. The use of language presupposes “an 
 
  
 
immediate pre-reflexive consensus on the meaning of the world” (Bourdieu 1997b, 
206)19, since linguistic communication is inconceivable without a background 
horizon of shared presuppositions. 
If doxa embodies the taken-for-grantedness of the world based on common 
sense, language reflects the meaning-ladenness of human existence derived from 
our communicative competence. Doxa and language are intimately intertwined, 
because there is no reflexive interpretation of reality without a pre-reflexive 
immersion in society. Just as language enables us to convert the seemingly objec- 
tive world into a genuinely normative world, doxa allows for “the transformation 
of history into nature, of the culturally arbitrary into nature” (Bourdieu 1998a, 
8)20. Language seems so natural to us that the surreptitious substance of its 
socio-historical evolution gets overshadowed by the misleading appearance of its 
socio-ontological constitution. The doxic nature of language contributes both to 
the socialization of the natural, in that it permeates the objectivity of the physical 
world with the normativity of the social world, and to the naturalization of the 
social, in that it impregnates the normativity of the social world with the objectiv- 
ity of the physical world.21 In other words, our access to language permits us to be 
both socialized and naturalized members of the human world: as socialized 
members, we are situated in the human world; as naturalized members, the human 
world is located in us. 
 
5. The Discursivity of Language 
A further significant feature of language is its discursive nature. Different social 
realms produce different social discourses, and language is the symbolic vehicle of 
these discourses. The discursive nature of language has been emphasized and exam- 
ined in a number of influential twentieth-century social theories: in Foucault’s 
(1975) theory of power, in Ricœur’s (1969) theory of interpretation, in Derrida’s 
(1967) theory of deconstruction, in Habermas’s (1981a/b) theory of communicative 
action, in Honneth’s (1994) theory of recognition, in Laclau and Mouffe’s ([1985] 
2001) theory of hegemony, in Eagleton’s (1991) and Zˇ izˇek’s (1989) respective theo- 
ries of ideology, in Butler’s (1990) theory of performativity, in Brandom’s (1994) 
theory of meaning, in Turner’s ([1984] 1996) theory of the body, in Giddens’s 
(1984) theory of structuration, in Delanty’s (2000) theory of modernization, in Ful- 
ler’s theory of knowledge ([1988] 2002), and in Boltanski and The´  venot’s (1991) 
theory of justification. Bourdieu’s genetic-structuralist approach is no exception. He 
stresses the discursive nature of language on five levels. 
First, a distinction should be drawn between ordinary and scientific discourses.22 
A reflexive sociology that is unambiguously committed to the principle of “episte- 
mological vigilance” (Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron 1968, 27)23 recognizes 
that “the separation between common belief and scientific discourse” (Bourdieu, 
Chamboredon and Passeron 1968, 27)24 is “particularly important in the case of 
the human sciences” (Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron 1968, 27)25. The dis- 
tinction between pre-reflexive and reflexive, implicit and explicit, practical and 
 
  
 
theoretical, and intuitive and critical knowledge is crucial to understanding the dif- 
ference between the reality of the social world and the study of the social world. 
To be more precise, ordinary and scientific discourses can be separated in terms of 
differentiality, hierarchy, priority, functionality  and  asymmetry. 
(a) Ordinary and scientific discourses are qualitatively different in that they consti- 
tute two diametrically opposed forms of knowledge: the former are governed 
by “practical reason” based on the reproduction of common sense, whereas 
the latter are generated by “theoretical reason” committed to meticulous and 
systematic enquiry. 
(b) Ordinary and scientific discourses stand in a hierarchical relation to each 
other: the na ı¨ve spontaneity of the former is epistemologically inferior to the 
critical reflexivity of the latter. 
(c) Ordinary and scientific discourses cannot be given the same priority: the social 
complicity of the former may be questioned by virtue of the investigative 
audacity of the latter. 
(d) Ordinary and scientific discourses serve fundamentally different functions: the 
former allow for the largely unconscious reproduction of society, whilst the 
latter can contribute to the epistemically informed transformation of an estab- 
lished reality. 
(e) Ordinary and scientific discourses are separated by a socio-structural asymme- 
try: the epistemological discrepancy between common sense and expert knowl- 
edge is rooted in the positional gap between laypersons and social researchers. 
In short, the intuitive “pre-constructions inherent in the routine of everyday 
discourse” (Bourdieu 1982b, 34, italics added)26, which emanate from “the presup- 
positions inscribed in the language” (Bourdieu 1982b, 34)27 of ordinary socializa- 
tion, need to be sharply distinguished from the critical reconstructions inherent in 
the spirit of scientific discourse, which stem from the presuppositions intrinsic to 
the language of methodical explanation. 
Second, a distinction should be drawn between disinterested and interested 
discourses, or, to be exact, between allegedly disinterested and openly interested 
discourses. Bourdieu insists that “[i]f the sociologist manages to produce any 
truth, he does so not despite the interest he has in producing that truth but because 
he has an interest in doing so——which is the exact opposite of the usual some- 
what fatuous discourse about ‘neutrality’” (Bourdieu [1984]-a 1993, 11, italics in 
original). In other words, there is no such thing as an “immaculate conception” 
(Bourdieu [1984]-a 1993, 11) of anything in the world because the construction of 
truth is always——at least implicitly——interest-bearing. If we recognize that “noth- 
ing is less socially neutral than the relationship between subject and object” 
(Bourdieu [1984]-b 1993, 53), then we have to acknowledge that our immersion 
in society is inescapably impregnated with the presence of normativity. One of the 
central concerns of a truly reflexive sociology, therefore, “is to be able to objectify 
one’s relation to the object so that discourse on the object is not the simple projec- 
tion of an unconscious relation to the object” (Bourdieu [1984]-b 1993, 53, italics 
 
  
 
added), but, on the contrary, the complex reflection upon a conscious relation 
between subject and object. There is no such thing as a genuinely disinterested 
discourse because subject and object are intimately intertwined. The subject is in 
the object, and the object is in the subject; for “[t]he body is in the social world”, 
and “the social world is in the body” (Bourdieu [1997] 2000, 152). If we account 
for “the contextuality of discourse” (Bourdieu 2001a, 49)28, we need to discard 
“the illusion of the transcendence of a transhistorical and transpersonal reason” 
(Bourdieu 1997b, 143)29. Put differently, if we accept that every discourse is 
shaped by the spatiotemporal determinacy of its own historicity, we have to reject 
the fictitious assumption that the neutral and disinterested appearance of rational 
discursivity can escape the partial and interested nature underlying all forms of 
linguistic  intelligibility. 
Third, a distinction should be drawn between legitimate and illegitimate 
discourses. Legitimate discourses possess, whereas illegitimate discourses lack, 
normative authority in relation to a field-divided reality (see Bourdieu 1982b, 7). 
Hence, discursive legitimacy is always a matter of field-specific determinacy. 
Economic discourses may be deemed irrelevant in the artistic field, and judicial dis- 
courses may be considered worthless in the cultural field, just as political discourses 
may be seen as out-of-place in the field of sports, and religious discourses may be 
regarded inappropriate in the scientific field. Be it in the economic field (“business 
for the sake of business”), the artistic field (“art for the sake of art”), the judicial 
field (“justice for the sake of justice”), the cultural field (“belonging for the sake of 
belonging”), the political field (“power for the sake of power”), the field of sports 
(“competition for the sake of competition”), the religious field (“faith for the sake 
of faith”) or the scientific field (“truth for the sake of truth”) (see Bourdieu 1997b, 
116–7)——the relative autonomy of fields is rooted in their capacity to function in 
accordance with their own laws and to create their own discourses of legitimacy in 
relation to their idiosyncratic functionality.30 The immanent laws of a legitimate 
field manifest themselves in “the immanent laws of a legitimate discourse” (Bour- 
dieu 1982e, 25)31, and the legitimacy of a particular discourse is reflected in the 
presence of normative authority over a field-specific domain of social reality. 
Fourth, a distinction should be drawn between instituted and ephemeral dis- 
courses. Whereas “instituted discourses” (Bourdieu [1972] 1977, 167) are relatively 
stable sets of “collective belief” (Bourdieu [1972] 1977, 167, italics removed) which 
have acquired sufficient symbolic “authority and necessity” (Bourdieu [1972] 1977, 
167, italics removed) to impose the legitimacy of their self-determinacy on particu- 
lar realms of society, “ephemeral discourses” (see Bourdieu [1972] 1977, 167) are 
fairly volatile sets of “collective thought” (Bourdieu [1972] 1977) whose symbolic 
determinacy is confined to the short-lived presence of contextual contingency. The 
problematic nature of instituted discourses is due to the fact that they tend to 
impose themselves as “prestigious and sterile meta-discourses” (Bourdieu 1999, 
334), which are driven by the illusory “anxiety over the ultimate foundation” 
(Bourdieu 1999, 334) of their own possibility and by “the mystical ambition to 
reach in the essence in a single leap” (Bourdieu 1999, 334–5) out of epistemologi- 
 
  
 
cal necessity. Instead of undergoing “the historical critique of unconscious 
presuppositions” (Bourdieu 1999, 334) and engaging in “the patient reconstruction 
of genesis” (Bourdieu 1999, 335), established discourses tend to be reproduced as 
universally recognized and symbolically powerful institutions, rather than criticized 
as socially imagined and relatively arbitrary constructions. Thus, social struggles in 
“the universe of discourse” (Bourdieu [1972] 1977, 170), that is, in “the universe 
of the thinkable” (Bourdieu [1972] 1977, 170), are symbolic struggles over the 
institutionalization of the ephemeral, that is, over the delimitation of the 
signifiable. 
Fifth, a distinction should be drawn between orthodox and heterodox discourses. 
Whereas orthodox discourses usually contribute to strengthening the legitimacy of 
symbolically and institutionally consolidated arrangements, heterodox discourses 
tend to be oriented towards undermining the authority of ideologically and materi- 
ally established conditions. The “confrontation of competing discourses” (Bourdieu 
[1972] 1977, 169) is symptomatic of the clash between conflicting interests. The 
orthodox, and largely conservative, discourses (orthodoxy or doxa) of the domi- 
nant groups serve the reproduction of social authority; by contrast, the heterodox, 
and often subversive, discourses (heterodoxy or heresy) of the dominated groups 
advocate the transformation of social reality (see Bourdieu [1984]-d 1993, 73). Not 
only is there a competition between orthodox and heterodox discourses, but there 
is also a “boundary between the universe of (orthodox or heterodox) discourse 
and the universe of doxa” (Bourdieu [1972] 1977, 170), that is, there is a qualita- 
tive difference between discursive and doxic forms of relating to the world. To be 
sure, orthodox and heterodox conceptions of the world can be both discursively 
and doxically grounded: discursively motivated imaginaries, regardless of whether 
they are conservative or subversive, allow for the conscious construction of themes 
and conceptions; doxically inspired imaginaries, on the other hand, rely on the 
unconscious reproduction of traditions and preconceptions. To the extent that “the 
production of a critical discourse” (Bourdieu [1972] 1977, 169) undermines 
the reproduction of uncritical doxa, the structural differentiation between domi- 
nant and dominated groups is expressed in the symbolic separation between ortho- 
dox and heterodox discourses. In short, doxa can be described as a set of 
“unexamined and unspoken presuppositions about the world” (Holton 2000, 91), 
orthodoxy “is conservative and looks backward to the reestablishment of previous 
doxa” (Holton 2000, 91), and heterodoxy aims at “contesting […] the conservatism 
of orthodoxy” (Holton 2000, 91), thereby reminding us of the fact that all social 
arrangements are provisional and malleable. 
 
6. The Legitimacy of  Language 
Another central aspect of language is its capacity either to sustain or to undermine 
the power of social legitimacy. Yet, the attainment of social legitimacy through the 
employment, exchange and exposure of linguistically articulated claims to validity 
is by no means a straightforward matter. In the most general sense, legitimacy can 
 
  
 
be defined as symbolic authority derived from an individual or collective actor’s 
ability to be socially recognized. Given the constraining power of relationally 
constituted and positionally differentiated realms of interaction, the legitimacy of 
linguistic validity is contingent upon the validity of social legitimacy. From a 
Bourdieusian perspective, the legitimacy of language contains at least five key 
dimensions. 
First, inherent in the legitimacy of language is the legitimacy of representation- 
ality. A legitimate language is essentially a “legitimate representation of the social 
world” (Bourdieu 1982b, 14)32. In other words, a legitimate Sprachanschauung is a 
legitimate Weltanschauung. Our cognitive absorption of the world is mediated by 
our linguistic interpretation of the world. As communicative entities, endowed 
with the capacity to represent reality by virtue of language, we are capable not only 
of perception and appreciation but also of linguistic interpretation: what the world 
means to us depends on the interpretive parameters of our language. Legitimate 
forms of language are legitimate forms of representing the world. 
Second, inherent in the legitimacy of language is the legitimacy of contextuality. 
A language is legitimate only insofar as it is embedded in a legitimate context. 
“[T]he ubiquity of the legitimate language” (Bourdieu 1982d, 17)33 is worth noth- 
ing without the situational contingency of the legitimate context. Just as different 
contexts produce different languages, different languages produce different 
contexts. To the extent that life forms generate language games, language games 
generate life forms. Whilst every social field creates its own doxa, every doxa 
creates its own social field. The context-dependent legitimacy of rational claims to 
validity is symptomatic of the historical determinacy of linguistically mediated 
forms of sociality. Linguistically raised validity claims are worthless if they fail to 
obtain legitimacy in relation to a field-specific domain of social reality. Legitimate 
forms of language are situated in legitimate contexts of the world. 
Third, inherent in the legitimacy of language is the legitimacy of capacity. The 
acquirement of a legitimate language depends on “the acquisition of a legitimate 
competence” (Bourdieu 1982e, 25)34, just as “the imposition of a legitimate lan- 
guage” (Bourdieu 1982e, 31)35 rests on the consolidation of a legitimate linguistic 
capacity. Competent speakers are capable of communication and interaction in 
concreto, rather than in abstracto: we develop our capacity to communicate and 
interact with each other not in a free-floating realm of discursive imagination, but 
in a relationally structured realm of asymmetrical socialization. The binary “defini- 
tion of legitimate and illegitimate” (Bourdieu 1982e, 25)36 modes of linguistic mas- 
tery is inconceivable without the symbolic division between legitimate and 
illegitimate forms of communicative capacity. If, as Bourdieu asserts, “the imposi- 
tion of the recognition of the legitimate language” (Bourdieu 1982e, 33)37 can be 
achieved only through the “devaluation of dialects and the instauration of a new 
hierarchy of linguistic usages” (Bourdieu 1982e, 33–4)38, then the most “legiti- 
mate” (Bourdieu 1982e, 31)39 communicative capacity is the allegedly most 
“expurgated and purified” (Bourdieu 1982e, 31)40 expression of “hypercorrect”41 
linguistic mastery. The development of a “legitimate linguistic competence”42 is 
 
  
 
subject to the attainment of “legitimate linguistic capital”43, which is embedded in 
a “legitimate linguistic habitus”44 and cultivated through continuous exposure to a 
“legitimate linguistic field”45. Processes of social legitimation based on linguistic 
habitualization are mechanisms of symbolic distinction reproduced through the 
hierarchical stratification of access to linguistic capital for the possibility of 
self-realization. Legitimate forms of language are generated through the production, 
imposition and recognition of legitimate linguistic capacities. 
Fourth, inherent in the legitimacy of language is the legitimacy of authority. Put 
differently, there is no linguistic legitimacy without symbolic authority. Indeed, 
linguistic legitimacy without symbolic authority would be worthless, for only insofar 
as the former is capable of exercising its power by virtue of the latter can language 
succeed in having a substantive impact on the way in which social actors make sense 
of both themselves and the world by which they find themselves surrounded. In 
essence, symbolic authority is “the power to make see and to make believe” (Bour- 
dieu 1982b, 19)46. An authorized speech act can transform itself into an authorizing 
speech act to the extent that the symbolic authority granted to a speaker converts 
itself into the symbolic authority granted by a speaker. “[T]he power to make see 
and to make believe” (Bourdieu 1982b, 19) cannot prescind from the power to be 
seen and to be believed. Paradoxically, the projective power to impose “schemes of 
perception, appreciation and action”47 upon society hinges on the receptive power to 
be perceived, appreciated and acted upon by society. To find oneself in a “position of 
authority to say with authority what saying with authority involves” (Bourdieu 
1982b, 56)48 presupposes that one is given the authority to give authority to 
particular schemes of linguistically raised validity. Legitimate forms of language are 
sustained through the exercise of legitimate authority. 
Fifth, inherent in the legitimacy of language is the legitimacy of normativity. The 
main function of normativity is to regulate relationally established forms of reality. 
In other words, normativity is habitualized objectivity. Society is impregnated with 
normativity, since the very possibility of its existence depends on its capacity to cre- 
ate mechanisms of collectively internalized habituality. Language is imbued with 
normativity because it is embedded in the established habituality of a given society. 
What is “socially recognized” (Bourdieu and Boltanski 1975, 8)49 is “recognized as 
legitimate” (Bourdieu and Boltanski 1975, 8)50 insofar as it is regarded and treated 
as normatively binding. The normalization of language is generally achieved on the 
basis of three social processes: standardization, officialization and institutionalization. 
(a) Normalization through linguistic standardization requires the binary differentia- 
tion between “correct” and “incorrect” forms of language use.51 (b) Normalization 
through linguistic officialization involves the binary separation between “national” 
and “regional” forms of language use.52 (c) Normalization through linguistic institu- 
tionalization manifests itself in the binary division between “paradigmatic” and 
“peripheral” forms of language use.53 In short, the normalization of language is 
founded on the legitimation and delegitimation of linguistic practices. Given the 
interest-ladenness permeating the taken-for-grantedness of the regulating lawfulness of 
“the normalized language” (Bourdieu 1982e, 32)54, it must be the task of a critical 
 
  
 
sociology of communication to uncover the relative arbitrariness underlying social 
processes of linguistic normalization. The symbolic power derived from “the fetish- 
ization of the legitimate language” (Bourdieu and Boltanski 1975, 8)55 is nothing but 
the social power exercised through the fetishization of the legitimate culture. 
Legitimate forms of language are produced and reproduced through the creation of 
legitimate modes of normativity. 
 
7. The Ideology of Language 
Another significant feature of language is that it is ideological. In fact, just as there 
is no ideology without linguisticality, there is no linguisticality without ideology. 
Language is unavoidably ideological because it is a vehicle for the production and 
articulation of ideas. Ideas are based on interrelated and interdependent, rather 
than free-floating and self-contained, concepts, however, disorganized and haphaz- 
ard they may be. Language permits, and indeed compels, us to express ideas 
through sets of interconnected concepts. Every ensemble of concepts is a symbolic 
conglomerate of more or less logically related ideas. Linguistic beings are con- 
demned to be ideological entities, because every language of the world (Sprachwelt) 
creates its own view of the world (Betrachtungswelt). 
If ideology, in the Marxian sense, can be conceived as “necessarily false 
consciousness”56, then language, in the Bourdieusian sense, can be regarded as 
“necessarily ideological consciousness”57. Insofar as the creation of linguisticality 
ineluctably involves “the imposition of the ‘true representation’ of reality” 
(Bourdieu 1982b, 16)58, ideology is a constitutive component of our daily search 
for intelligibility. A Weltanschauung of a particular social group is always also a 
Feldanschauung from a given social place mediated by a Sprachanschauung with a 
specific social meaning. The “power to make see and to make believe” (Bourdieu 
1982b, 19)59 is the power “to make recognize” (Bourdieu 1979b, 5)60 what would 
otherwise not be recognized. Ideology is a self-perpetuating form of “collective 
misrecognition” (Bourdieu and Delsaut 1975, 23)61 of arbitrariness owing to the 
normalizing exercise of “social recognition”62 of taken-for-grantedness. 
The “imposition of the dominant position” (Bourdieu 1980b, 69)63 is incon- 
ceivable without the diffusion of the dominant ideology through the dissemination 
of the dominant language. At the end of the day, every ideology strives to be a 
“legitimate mode of perception” (Bourdieu 1984, 7)64 solidified by legitimate 
modes of action and reflected in legitimate modes of linguistic conception. The 
“symbolic power to cause one to see and to believe (faire voir et faire croire) in 
order to impose visions of the world and, in particular, visions of the divisions of 
the world” (Bourdieu 1999, 337) is tantamount to the capacity to normalize 
“principles of classification” (Bourdieu 1999, 337) through the discursive power of 
linguistic ideologization. In brief, legitimate ideologies are legitimate languages, just 
as legitimate languages are legitimate ideologies. 
 
  
 
8. The Contestability of Language 
A further central feature of language is that it is contestable. In fact, the contestable 
nature of linguistic relations emanates from the transformative potential of social 
relations. Just as social relations——and, more importantly, both the symbolic and 
the material arrangements by which they are sustained——are never simply “a given” 
(see Camic [1986] 2000, 328) whose pervasiveness is reflected in habitualized 
mechanisms of repetitive reproduction, linguistic relations are always open to 
transformative reconstruction. If “[t]he history of all hitherto existing society is the 
history of class struggles” (Marx and Engels [1848] 1985, 79), the history of all hith- 
erto existing language is “the history of symbolic struggles” (Bourdieu 1982b, 17)65. 
Symbolic struggles, in the Bourdieusian sense, are ideological conflicts over “the 
imposition of the ‘true representation’ of reality” (Bourdieu 1982b, 16)66. To be 
sure, what is considered to be a “‘true representation’ of reality” (Bourdieu 1982b, 
16) is spatiotemporally contingent: different social spaces generate different social 
discourses in different historical contexts, and——more importantly——different 
social groups, situated within spatiotemporally specific settings, struggle to impose 
their view of the world upon the rest of the world with the aim of converting their 
“representation of reality” into the “reality of representation”.67 
Peripheral ideologies succeed in carving a niche for themselves to pervade the 
margins of society; paradigmatic ideologies, by contrast, succeed in widely impos- 
ing themselves in order to hegemonize the centre of society. The secret of success- 
ful ideologies is the consolidation of tacit hegemonies: “what is essential goes 
without saying because it comes without saying: the tradition is silent, not least 
about itself as a tradition” (Bourdieu [1972] 1977, 167)68. The taken-for-granted- 
ness of ideology is hidden behind the outspokenness of linguistically evoked claims 
to validity. What is ideologically true is what is practically considered to be true. As 
long as the contestability of ideological claims to validity remains trapped in the 
linguistic background horizon of implicit legitimacy, the truth of social struggles 
will continue to be contested in social struggles over truth. For “if there is one 
truth it is the fact that truth is a stake of struggles” (Bourdieu 1982b, 25)69. The 
struggle over language is a struggle over truth, and the struggle over truth is a 
struggle over symbolic power. The existence of different life forms is reflected in 
the existence of different language games, just as the existence of different social 
struggles manifests itself in the existence of different “symbolic struggles” (Bour- 
dieu 1986, 2)70. Every symbolic struggle is essentially a “struggle over the legitimate 
vision of the world” (Bourdieu 2001a, 170)71, that is, a struggle “over the monop- 
oly of the legitimate representation” (Bourdieu 2001a, 150)72 of reality. The pro- 
duction of language, then, can be regarded as an “inseparably symbolic and 
political” (Bourdieu 2001a, 47)73 feature of the social world, for relations of com- 
munication are always “interested”74 and “value-laden”75, rather than “disinter- 
ested”76 and “value-free”77, relations of socialization. Linguistic patterns of 
signification and interpretation are contestable because they are embedded in social 
 
 
 
patterns of stratification and hierarchization. The relative taken-for-grantedness of 
the former cannot escape the relative arbitrariness of the latter. 
 
9. The Commodifiability of Language 
Another——somewhat problematic——feature of language is that it is commodifiable. 
In essence, Bourdieu conceives of the “linguistic market”78 as a “market of 
symbolic goods”79. Advanced societies are characterized by the proliferation of a 
multiplicity of markets. Yet, the production of all markets——regardless of their 
relative autonomy, idiosyncrasy and irreducibility80——depends on the reproduc- 
tion of the linguistic market. Language is an omnipresent feature of society, and 
not even spheres that are dictated by the laws of profitability can escape the ubiq- 
uity of linguistic signifiability. The sociological significance of the linguistic market 
is reflected in its capacity to affirm its functional omnipresence in other markets: 
the labour market, the market of goods and services, the market of knowledge and 
skills, the market of training and education, the market of science and technology, 
the market of arts and humanities, the market of culture and communica- 
tion——all markets are mediated by and managed through the linguistic market. 
The sociological importance of the linguistic market is due not only to its 
ubiquity in commodified realms of society, but also to the commodifiability of its 
own reality. The linguistic realm is a market itself. Linguistic relations may have a 
communicative foreground, but they also have a purposive background. It would 
be na ı¨ve to reduce linguistic encounters to purely understanding-oriented interac- 
tions, as they are——in most cases——also largely, if not primarily, utility-driven 
transactions. The dream of the subject’s communicative engagement in disinterest- 
edness is shattered when facing the reality of the actor’s purposive investment in 
interestedness. Habermas’s paradisal view of the “ideal speech situation”81 needs to 
be replaced by Bourdieu’s relational account of the “real speech situation”82, since 
“it is rare that, in ordinary existence, language functions as a pure instrument of 
communication” (Bourdieu 1982f, 60)83. The use of language as a mere vehicle of 
communication is the exception; the use of language as an instrument of symbolic 
power is the norm. 
The task of a “materialist analysis of the economy of symbolic goods” (Bour- 
dieu 1998a, 9)84 is to uncover the stratifying logic which underlies differentiated 
fields of cultural production. To recognize that the “communicative relation 
between a transmitter (coding) and a receiver (decoding)” (Bourdieu 1982f, 59)85 
is never simply a “linguistic exchange” (Bourdieu 1982f, 59)86 but always also a 
“symbolic exchange” (Bourdieu [1972] 1977, 167) requires acknowledging that 
every linguistically raised “validity claim” (Bourdieu 2002b, 351) is a symbolically 
laden “value claim” (Bourdieu 1982d, 15; Bourdieu 1982e, 43, 45 and 46): validity 
claims are value claims because they are legitimacy claims, recognition claims, in 
short, they are social claims.87 The ultimate currency in every society is legitimacy. 
Whereas access to legitimacy allows for the possibility of socially   recognized 
 
  
 
agency, absence of legitimacy creates the need to fill a vacuum of social indetermi- 
nacy through the unrecognized affirmation of symbolic authority. 
From a Bourdieusian perspective, the critical “analysis of the economy of 
symbolic goods” (Bourdieu 1998a, 9)88 in general and of “the economy of linguis- 
tic exchanges” (Bourdieu 1982d) in particular needs to account for the structural 
interplay between three key sociological dimensions: (a) linguistic fields, (b) 
linguistic habitus and (c) linguistic capital. 
(a) Every linguistic field is produced and reproduced by a particular “linguistic 
community” (Bourdieu 1982e, 26)89, which can be defined as “a group of 
people who use the same system of speech-signals” (Bourdieu 1982e, 26)90. A 
minimum of semantically, syntactically and phonetically defined rules and 
conventions is “the precondition” (Bourdieu 1982e, 26)91 both “for economic 
production” (Bourdieu 1982e, 26)92 and “for symbolic domination” (Bourdieu 
1982e, 26)93. Even societies with a high degree of systemic differentiality and 
cultural heterogeneity cannot exist without a minimum of collective identity 
and demographic homogeneity. Just as “space […] defines its language” 
(Bourdieu 1982e, 26)94, “language […] defines its space” (Bourdieu 1982e, 
26)95. To the extent that every field generates its own language, every language 
generates its own field. Given that every “field of linguistic production” 
(Bourdieu [1977] 1992, 163) constitutes a “horizon of reference” (Bourdieu 
[1977] 1992, 163), “the unification of the linguistic field” (Bourdieu and Bol- 
tanski 1975, 4)96 is made possible not only by the imposition of intelligibil- 
ity——that is, of what can and what cannot be said——but also by “the 
imposition of legitimacy” (Bourdieu and Boltanski 1975, 4, italics 
added)97——that is, of what should and what should not be said. Hence, 
linguistic fields define the symbolic boundaries of intelligibility and legitimacy. 
(b) Every linguistic habitus is produced and reproduced by an individual member 
of a particular linguistic community. A really existing language cannot survive 
without really existing speakers. The habitual production of linguistic conven- 
tions is practically worthless without the habitual construction of linguistic 
entities. Actors capable of linguistically filtered perception and appreciation 
are subjects capable of habitually structured reflection and interpretation. For 
linguistic entities, language is the ultimate source of meaning: even if we were 
convinced of the meaninglessness of life, we could not escape the meaning- 
ladenness of language. “In its structure and use language is one of the central 
vehicles of habitus” (Hanks 1993, 139). At the same time, in its structure and 
use habitus is one of the central vehicles of language. The interdependence of 
habituality and linguisticality resides in the communicative infrastructure of 
every society. 
(c) Linguistic capital is unequally distributed in every linguistic community. 
Having access to linguistic capital is contingent not only upon the capacity to 
immerse oneself in a particular language but also, more importantly, upon the 
ability to develop a sense of belonging to a particular speech community. The 
 
 
 
acquisition of linguistic capital manifests itself in the cultivation of a linguistic 
habitus developed in relation to a linguistic field. Indeed, both our acquisition 
of linguistic capital and our cultivation of a linguistic habitus depend upon 
our regular exposure to and continuous enclosure in a linguistic field. In this 
sense, the seemingly most disinterested “everyday linguistic exchanges” 
(Thompson 1992, 2) can be regarded as “situated encounters between agents 
endowed with socially structured resources and competences, in such a way that 
every linguistic interaction, however personal and insignificant it may seem, 
bears the traces of the social structure that it both expresses and helps to 
reproduce” (Thompson 1992, 2, italics added). In other words, the develop- 
ment of our linguistic competence is never a neutral or transcendental matter, 
but always an environmentally determined and socially embedded affair. The 
“social value of linguistic competence” (Bourdieu 1982e, 46)98 is conditional 
upon the symbolic worth of “linguistic capital”: speaking a language in a legit- 
imate way requires mastering the semantic, syntactic and phonetic codes of 
the legitimate linguistic field through the development of a legitimate linguis- 
tic habitus derived from the acquisition of legitimate linguistic capital. Sym- 
bolic profits gained from linguistic distinction can be translated into social 
power gained from symbolic power. To be sure, given the “interconvertibil- 
ity”99 of different types of capital, the attainment of linguistic resources 
depends on access to various forms of capital, notably on access to social capi- 
tal, cultural capital, educational capital and economic capital. Irrespective of 
the question of how different forms of capital are obtained, our participation 
in a linguistic field and our cultivation of a linguistic habitus are inconceivable 
without the acquisition of linguistic capital. 
 
 
10. The Symbolic Power of Language 
Another crucial feature of language is that it is both a source and a medium of 
symbolic power. Just as “language is an integral part of social life” (Thompson 
1992, 1), social life is an integral part of language. To the extent that social life is 
permeated by power relations, language is permeated by these power relations. 
And, if symbolic relations are power relations, language is a form of symbolic 
power. The critical analysis of symbolic power is essential to a comprehensive 
examination of the social, since it unveils the subtlety and efficiency with which 
power relations operate beyond subjective consciousness.100 In order to demon- 
strate this, it makes sense to reflect upon the nature of symbolic power on five 
levels: (a) symbolic power and society, (b) symbolic power and instrumentality, (c) 
symbolic power and universality, (d) symbolic power and validity and (e) symbolic 
power and legitimacy (see Susen 2007, 142–7). 
(a) Symbolic power is embedded in society. The societal nature of symbolic power 
may seem rather obvious. It is difficult, however, to overemphasize the socio- 
logical significance of the fact that symbolic power is always situated in, and 
 
  
 
exercised in relation to, society. In order to understand the various——often 
subtle and hidden——ways in which symbolic power operates, it is imperative 
to comprehend how it is used in society. Thus, the “[r]elation of communica- 
tion between a transmitter and a receiver” (Bourdieu 1982f, 59)101 needs to be 
studied as an embodied “linguistic exchange” (Bourdieu 1982f, 59)102 that is 
embedded within, rather than as a disembodied linguistic encounter that is 
detached from, social reality. If we account for the fact that, as speakers, we 
are members of a “linguistic community” (Bourdieu 1982d, 18)103, then we 
are obliged to accept that symbolic exchanges are located within the relation- 
ally constituted realm of society. Symbolic power is a form of social power. 
(b) Symbolic power is impregnated with instrumentality. As such, it can be, and 
is, used as an instrument of social power. The secret of the efficacy of sym- 
bolic power is that it escapes the empirical eye that looks out for evidence- 
based provability. “For symbolic power is that invisible power which can be 
exercised only with the complicity of those who do not want to know that they 
are subject to it or even that they themselves exercise it” (Bourdieu [1977] 
1992, 164, italics added). Our daily complicity with symbolic power makes its 
instrumental nature not less but more subtle. If it “is rare that, in ordinary 
existence, language functions as a pure instrument of communication” (Bour- 
dieu 1982f, 60)104, it is common that, in everyday life, language serves as a 
mere vehicle of social domination. In fact, to the extent that all social rela- 
tions are power relations, the real possibility of communicative empowerment 
is always already inhabited by the possible reality of symbolic disempower- 
ment. “Symbolic power is effectively this form of domination which——over- 
coming the common opposition between relations of meaning and relations 
of force, between communication and domination——is realized through acts 
of communication under which it is concealed” (Bourdieu 1976, 127)105. The 
most pervasive instruments of social power are invasive forms of symbolic 
power. Symbolic power is a form of instrumentalized and instrumentalizing 
power. 
(c) Symbolic power creates the illusion of universality. Not only are “linguistic 
relations […] always relations of symbolic power” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992d, 142), but they are also relations oriented towards creating a false 
currency of transcendental universality founded on the genuine determinacy 
of societal particularity. Symbolic power succeeds in making the particular 
look universal when making the social appear natural. Indeed, “to impose the 
partial truth of a group as the truth of the objective relations between the 
groups” (Bourdieu 1982b, 23)106 means to install a social hegemony that 
represents the interests of a minority in the name of the majority. National 
programmes of standardized linguistification are large-scale endeavours of 
social regulation. The “consecration-universalization process” (Bourdieu 
2001a, 58)107 allowing for the normalization of a particular language seems to 
convert the spatiotemporal contingency of linguistic conventionality into the 
transcendental determinacy of linguistic universality. Symbolic power  makes 
 
 
 
the recognizably particular look unrecognizably universal. For symbolic power 
can conceal the predominance of particular interests behind the appearance of 
universal interests. Symbolic power is a form of universalized and universalizing 
power. 
(d) Symbolic power needs to claim validity in order to impose itself upon society. 
In fact, symbolic power can permeate reality only insofar as it succeeds in 
constantly reaffirming its tangible impact on the stratified construction of 
society by claiming validity for the sake of its own, tacitly reproduced, 
legitimacy. Yet, rather than portraying validity as a cognitive source of 
removed transcendentality, here it is considered as a recognitive force of lived 
sociality: validity needs to be validated in order to be valid; that is, validity 
needs to be recognized by society, or at least by particular members of society, 
in order to play a role in the symbolic construction of reality. To suggest that 
validity is “recognized value”108 means to accept that meaning acquires 
normative significance through processes of social recognition. Far from repre- 
senting an endogenously determined presupposition of rationality, validity 
constitutes an exogenously constrained construction of society. In this sense, 
Habermas’s paradisal view of the “ideal speech situation” is diametrically 
opposed to Bourdieu’s relational account of the “real speech situation”. The 
idea of pure linguistic Gesellschaftlichkeit109 can hardly be sustained when 
confronting  the  reality  of  social  Kra¨fteverha¨ltnisma¨ßigkeit110.  The  validity  of 
utterances is determined not by the force de la rationalite  ´derived from linguis- 
tic modes of interactionality, but by the rapports de force111 created by strati- 
fied forms of society. Linguistic validity is practically worthless if it fails to 
obtain normative legitimacy through its recognition by a given social 
community. Thus, cognitive claims for validity are recognitive claims for 
social legitimacy oriented towards the attainment of symbolic authority.112 
Symbolic power is a form of validated and validating power. 
(e) Symbolic power needs to claim legitimacy in order to affirm its presence in 
society. Indeed, the raison d’ˆ etre of symbolic power is the acquisition of 
legitimacy. To compete for symbolic power through language means to strug- 
gle over the legitimacy of the world through the “legitimacy of the word” 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992d, 148). Just as efficient modes of linguistic 
communication always have a power dimension, resourceful forms of social 
“domination always [have] a symbolic dimension” (Bourdieu 1997b, 206)113. 
The effectiveness of symbolic power rests on its capacity to provide systems of 
domination with social legitimacy by normalizing the silent exercise of quotid- 
ian complicity.114 Owing to its subtle nature, symbolic violence can be charac- 
terized as a form of “sweet violence, insensitive, invisible to its own victims 
that is exercised essentially by the purely symbolic paths of communication 
and knowledge, or——to be more precise——of ignorance, of recognition or, at 
the limit, of feeling” (Bourdieu 1998a, 7)115. Paradoxically, then, the legiti- 
macy of domination cannot dispense with the complicity of the dominated: 
symbolic power operates by making “the dominated contribute to their own 
 
  
 
domination” (Bourdieu 2001b, 9)116. Since stable forms of legitimacy need to 
create reliable modes of complicity, “[t]here is no symbolic power without a 
symbolism of power” (Bourdieu 1982f, 73)117. We are most blind to symbolic 
power when we are most immersed in it, for complicity is the most forceful 
guarantee of legitimacy. Symbolic power is a form of legitimized and legitimizing 
power. 
 
 
Critical Reflections 
This paper has sought to shed light on Bourdieu’s conception of language. As 
demonstrated above, the concept of language is a central category in his oeuvre. 
Perhaps the most fundamental assumption in Bourdieu’s writings on language 
is the idea that the production of communicative relations is inconceivable 
without the reproduction of power relations, for the meaning-bearing construc- 
tion of linguisticality cannot be dissociated from the interest-laden constitution 
of society. In this light, rationally ascertained “validity claims” are relationally 
determined “legitimacy claims”, since linguistic power is unavoidably a matter 
of social power. Examining both the philosophical and the sociological implica- 
tions of this view, the previous analysis has suggested that we need to identify 
the unavoidable conditions of the real speech situation, rather than the avoid- 
able conditions of the ideal speech situation, in order to understand that the 
legitimacy of linguistic validity is always contingent upon the validity of social 
legitimacy. 
More controversially, the foregoing study has sought to illustrate that Bour- 
dieu’s account of language is based on a number of ontological presuppositions, 
that is, on a set of universal assumptions about the very nature of language. To 
this end, the paper has focused on 10 features that, in accordance with Bourdieu’s 
writings, can be regarded as inherent in language: (1) the sociality of language, (2) 
the dialecticality of language, (3) the signifiability of language, (4) the doxicality of 
language, (5) the discursivity of language, (6) the legitimacy of language, (7) the 
ideology of language, (8) the contestability of language, (9) the commodifiability of 
language and (10) the symbolic power of language. The insights of the preceding 
enquiry, which support the view that there is such a thing as a Bourdieusian 
philosophy of language, can be synthesized as follows: 
(1) Language is both a socially constructed and a socially embedded force of 
human action. As a socially constructed force, its existence derives from the 
collective production of linguistic utterances; as a socially embedded force, its 
existence is subject to the collective framing of linguistic utterances. 
Linguisticality is an integral element of human sociality. 
(2) Language is dialectically produced and reproduced. Its dialectical nature 
operates on three main levels. On the level of competence and performance, 
language owes its existence to subjects who are both in principle and in 
practice capable of speech and action. On the level of grammar and 
 
 
 
pragmatics, language owes its existence to both symbolic structures and 
symbolic processes. On the level of commonality and singularity, language 
owes its existence to both shared and unique forms of human experience. 
(3) Language is both a vehicle and an outcome of our need to attribute 
meaning to the world. Linguistically mediated schemes of perception and 
appreciation are relationally constructed frameworks of reflection and 
action. 
(4) Language is a doxic affair in the sense that the establishment of a linguistic 
relation to reality is possible only through the symbolically mediated 
taken-for-grantedness of society. The doxic nature of language contributes 
to both the socialization of the natural and the naturalization of the social. 
(5) Language permits us to develop a discursive relation to the world. The ten- 
sions between ordinary and scientific, disinterested and interested, legitimate 
and illegitimate, instituted and ephemeral, as well as orthodox and hetero- 
dox discourses are indicative of the functional elasticity underlying human 
linguisticality. 
(6) Language can be used as a symbolic resource either to sustain or to under- 
mine the power of social legitimacy. Legitimate languages are reflected in 
legitimate representations, situated in legitimate contexts, embodied in legiti- 
mate linguistic capacities, materialized in legitimate authorities and imbued 
with legitimate normativities. 
(7) Language is unavoidably ideological, because it is by definition a conceptu- 
ally mediated representation of the world. To recognize that every language 
creates its own view of the world means to acknowledge that every 
Sprachanschauung is a form of Weltanschauung. 
(8) Language is always contestable, since the validity of linguistically raised 
knowledge claims is socio-historically contingent. Every struggle over 
language is a struggle over the legitimate representation of the world. 
(9) Language is commodifiable in that it constitutes an essential component of 
the market of symbolic goods. The economy of linguistic exchanges is 
driven by the dynamic interplay between linguistic fields, linguistic habitus 
and linguistic capital. In fact, the participation in a linguistic field, the culti- 
vation of a linguistic habitus and the acquisition of linguistic capital are 
preconditions for the construction of a linguistic world. 
(10) Language is both a source and a medium of symbolic power. If all linguistic 
relations are social relations and if all social relations are power relations, 
then our daily immersion in language involves our complicit participation 
in the exercise of symbolic power. 
Contrary to common belief, Bourdieu identifies a number of transcendental 
features of language, he provides us with philosophical tools to understand the 
nature of language, and he conceives of language as a fundamental, albeit not 
necessarily foundational, element of social life. In light of the above analysis, a 
fine-grained picture emerges that illustrates that Bourdieu’s account of language is 
 
  
 
based on a number of ontological presuppositions, that is, on a set of universal 
assumptions about the nature and functioning of language. Nonetheless, whilst 
acknowledging that Bourdieu’s approach to language is far more complex and 
insightful than commonly recognized, we need to shed light on its shortcomings 
and limitations. Following the structure of the previous enquiry, this paper shall 
conclude by arguing that, despite the fact that Bourdieu offers useful conceptual 
and methodological tools for the study of symbolic relations, his account of 
language suffers from a number of serious flaws. It is the purpose of this final 
section to examine these flaws in some detail. 
(1) Of course, Bourdieu is right to emphasize the social nature of language. 
The question is not, however, whether language, through processes of human 
interaction, is collectively produced and, within contexts of human interaction, 
collectively framed. Rather, the question is the extent to which language endows 
human actors with the capacity to transcend the spatiotemporal determinacy 
underlying their relationally constituted immersion in society. Even if we share 
Bourdieu’s view that there are no historically removed and socially disembedded 
forms of linguisticality, we need to account for the cognitive autonomy enjoyed by 
all modes of intelligibility. To recognize that language games are intersubjectively 
constructed and spatiotemporally situated does not mean that linguistic ways of 
engaging with the world are reducible to the collective consciousness of human 
actors and the relative arbitrariness of social contexts. 
Regardless of whether we consider political, judicial, scientific, religious or 
artistic forms of linguistic expression, in principle all language games have the 
empowering capacity to subvert the spatiotemporal determinacy of a given social 
reality by virtue of the cognitive autonomy inherent in discursive claims to episte- 
mic validity. If, as political entities, we were mere products of our time, we would 
not be able to transform the givenness of social arrangements through the tran- 
scendent potential of normative considerations. If all judges were dogmatic follow- 
ers of legal rules and regulations, they would not be able to contest each other’s 
verdicts on the basis of logical arguments and rational discourse. If scientists were 
sheer paradigm-surfers of their academic disciplines, they would be incapable of 
generating innovative research agendas with ground-breaking ways of looking at 
things. If all believers were condemned to be eternal prisoners of their faith, there 
would be no such thing as religious transformation, let alone religious conversion. 
If there were no room for aesthetic creativity, artists would not be endowed with 
the playful ability to escape the detrimental preponderance of instrumental ratio- 
nality in totally administered and commodified societies. In short, no matter how 
powerful the constraining conditions of production in a given social field may be, 
we must not underestimate people’s capacity to challenge the relationally consti- 
tuted determinacy of the position they occupy in society by dint of the relative 
autonomy that inhabits symbolically mediated forms of agency. 
(2) In accordance with influential linguistic theorists such as Saussure, Austin, 
Chomsky and Habermas, Bourdieu stresses the fact that language is  dialectically 
 
  
 
produced. This is essentially due to the intrinsic relationship between (a) compe- 
tence and performance, (b) grammar and pragmatics and (c) commonality and sin- 
gularity. From a sympathetic angle, one may regard Bourdieu’s critical engagement 
with these conceptual pairs as indicative of his firm commitment to overcoming 
counterproductive antinomies in the social sciences. It must be highlighted, how- 
ever, that his analysis of each of these dimensions is problematic for a number of 
reasons. 
(a) The main problem with Bourdieu’s account of the relationship between 
competence and performance is that it conceives of both dimensions primarily in 
terms of their social determinacy, rather than in terms of their anthropological speci- 
ficity. Consequently, Bourdieu fails to explore the species-constitutive implications 
of the fact that linguistically equipped entities are not only performative beings 
capable of action and communication, but also discursive subjects capable of rea- 
soning and reflection. Put differently, our sens linguistique is not only a sens pra- 
tique, which allows us to engage in successful communication, but also a sens 
the´orique, which enables us to mobilize our discursive resources of reflection. 
(b) The most significant problem with Bourdieu’s account of the relationship 
between grammar and pragmatics is that it does not shed any light on the extent 
to which the rational logic of particular language games is impregnated with the 
interactional infrastructure of specific life forms. Put in Bourdieusian terms, the 
question is to what degree the norms and conventions of a given field are reflected 
in the rules and principles of a given doxa, and vice versa. Different modes of pro- 
duction are sustained by different ideologies (Marx); different life forms generate 
different language games (Wittgenstein); different regimes of power manifest them- 
selves in different discourses of power (Foucault); different lifeworlds are suffused 
with different sociocultural horizons (Habermas); different regimes of action are 
negotiated through different regimes of justification (Boltanski); and different 
social fields create different forms of doxa (Bourdieu). Whatever theoretical model 
one seeks to defend in order to make sense of the multifaceted ways in which spe- 
cific sets of social arrangements create particular forms of symbolic relations, it 
would be reductive to consider the grammatical rules of linguistic frameworks as 
mere homological epiphenomena of interactional conventions. 
(c) The key problem with Bourdieu’s account of the relationship between com- 
monality and singularity is that, with regard to linguistic relations in particular and 
human relations in general, it tends to prioritize social over individual dimensions 
of people’s existence. Bourdieu’s one-sided emphasis on the structuring power 
deriving from the social conditions of production, whose preponderance shapes, 
and often determines, different modes of human action, leads him to disregard the 
individualizing function of language in processes of personality and identity forma- 
tion. The commonality of language cannot do away with the singularity of individ- 
ual experience. Undeniably, all languages share a set of essential functions: the 
constative, normative, expressive and communicative functions of language ema- 
nate from the teleological, social, dramaturgical and intelligible dimensions of 
human action. Yet, even if we recognize that language is a common medium in 
 
  
 
terms of both its transcendent functions, which rise above the spatiotemporal speci- 
ficity of a given linguistic community, and its immanent functions, which allow for 
the construction of a sense of cultural identity, we must account for the irreplace- 
able role that linguisticality plays in the meaning-laden construction of 
individuality. In other words, language is a vehicle of both socialization and indi- 
viduation. As a speaking species, we develop not only a sense of cultural identity, 
which we share with members of the same linguistic community, but also a sense 
of personal identity, through which we assert our ontological singularity.118 
Language is a common house of being constructed by unique carriers of meaning. 
(3) Given that his work is generally associated with the sociology of domina- 
tion, rather than with the sociology of communication, it may be tempting to 
overlook the fact that Bourdieu is willing to acknowledge that language plays a 
pivotal role not only in the daily reproduction of power mechanisms but also, in a 
more fundamental sense, in the symbolic construction of social relations. As dem- 
onstrated above, Bourdieu considers language to be a symbolic tool without whose 
interpretive resources the production of meaning in field-specific contexts would 
be inconceivable. Fields are universal because our place in society depends on the 
positional structuration of reality; habitus is universal because our interaction with 
society is unthinkable without the dispositional naturalization of reality; and capi- 
tal is universal because, in order to perpetuate or undermine the legitimacy of a 
given society, we need to mobilize the material and symbolic resources that permit 
us to act upon reality. Since language allows for the symbolic mediation of reality, 
we need to account for the socio-ontological centrality of everyday hermeneutics: 
“[h]ermeneutics is universal because understanding is the fundamental way in 
which human beings participate in the world” (Outhwaite 1987, 62; cf. Susen 
2007, 41). In other words, linguistic beings are meaning-producing entities. 
Bourdieu does not explore, however, the extent to which the meaning-bearing 
constitution of linguistic forms of intelligibility escapes the power-laden nature 
permeating stratified forms of society. As critical sociologists, we need to do justice 
to the socio-ontological significance of the empowering potentials built into lan- 
guage, in particular the rational resources that allow not only for mutual under- 
standing and agreement, but also for the consolidation of social relations based on 
trust and empathy. To be sure, Bourdieu’s critical analysis of the economy of lin- 
guistic exchanges is methodologically useful and sociologically insightful in permit- 
ting us to examine the degree to which the universality of claims to epistemic 
validity is contingent upon the symbolic authority derived from social legitimacy. 
Nevertheless, even if we accept that there are no linguistic discourses without social 
resources and no explicit claims to epistemic validity without an implicit assertion 
of social legitimacy, we need to account for our species-constitutive capacity to 
draw on the communicative power of linguistic intelligibility, in order to overcome 
the material and symbolic distance generated by social asymmetries. 
(4) Bourdieu attributes great importance to the doxic nature of language. In 
this regard, his account of language resides in the tradition of hermeneutic 
 
  
 
philosophy. Linguistic beings are prejudgmental entities, since foreground utter- 
ances are unavoidably embedded in background traditions. Put differently, every 
discursive reflection upon reality presupposes the doxic taken-for-grantedness of 
society. Yet, even if we sympathize with Bourdieu’s engagement with the sociologi- 
cal significance of symbolically mediated background traditions, we must face up 
to the fact that language is both a structuring and a structured structure. Insofar 
as Bourdieu focuses almost exclusively on the reproductive mechanisms, rather 
than the transformative elements, underlying communicative processes, he overesti- 
mates the extent to which linguistic resources structure and determine largely com- 
plicit and unreflective agents and underestimates the extent to which language is 
structured and determined by potentially creative and reflective subjects. Language 
evolves because of, rather than despite, the fact that it is constantly reinvented and 
resignified by those who use it. The hidden conservatism that pervades philosophi- 
cal hermeneutics is epitomized in Gadamer’s systematic insistence upon the socio- 
historical influence of linguistically constituted prejudices. In light of Bourdieu’s 
emphasis on the doxic nature of language, his account of symbolic exchanges turns 
out to be just as problematic as the approaches he accuses of remaining trapped in 
“hermeneutic idealism” and “‘pure’ linguistics” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992d, 
141)119. If doxa were an unchallengeable source of ideological disempowerment, 
rather than an interpretive resource of practical empowerment, the usage and 
meanings of words would never change. Words speak for themselves, but so do 
the speakers who utter them. 
(5) Similar to other influential twentieth-century social theorists, Bourdieu is 
concerned with the discursive nature of language. Different social realms produce 
different social discourses, and language is the symbolic vehicle of these discourses. 
Although, as illustrated above, Bourdieu’s account of language provides useful 
insights into the differences between ordinary and scientific, disinterested and inter- 
ested, legitimate and illegitimate, instituted and ephemeral, and orthodox and hetero- 
dox discourses, it is also problematic in these respects. 
(a) When drawing a distinction between ordinary and scientific discourses, we 
are confronted with three epistemological options. The first——arguably positiv- 
ist——option is to assume that, in principle, scientific knowledge is superior to 
ordinary knowledge, because the former permits us to uncover the causal mecha- 
nisms underlying the natural and the social worlds, whereas the latter is largely 
based on misconceptions and misrepresentations derived from common sense. The 
second——arguably interpretivist——option is to suggest that, ultimately, ordinary 
knowledge is more valuable than scientific knowledge. The former allows for an 
authentic understanding of the world, obtained through immediate experience, 
whilst the latter tends to produce abstract concepts, sterile data and self-referential 
research agendas, which fail to grasp the meaning-bearing constitution of everyday 
existence. The third——arguably contextualist——option is to accept that the point is 
not to establish an artificial hierarchy between scientific and ordinary knowledge, 
but to concede that one is not necessarily more insightful than the other. In fact, it 
 
  
 
depends on the kind of insights one seeks to gain whether scientific or ordinary 
knowledge proves to be the more appropriate tool for comprehending particular 
aspects of social reality. The aim of providing a scientific——that is, analytical, 
methodical and explanatory——account of an objectively existing reality is one 
thing; the idea of giving an ordinary——that is, spontaneous, intuitive and interpre- 
tive——account of a subjectively grasped reality is quite another. Since Bourdieu 
unambiguously favours scientific over ordinary forms of knowledge, he tends to 
disregard the epistemic capacities of social actors: (i) as representational beings, we 
are able to produce descriptive knowledge; (ii) as analytical beings, we construct sys- 
tematic knowledge; (iii) as reflexive beings, we are capable of developing explanatory 
knowledge; (iv) as critical beings, we generate normative knowledge; (v) as rational 
beings, we participate in the exchange of discursive knowledge; (vi) as learning 
beings, we build on cumulative knowledge; (vii) as projective beings, we can even 
make assumptions about the future on the basis of predictive knowledge. Rather 
than regarding these cognitive capacities as an epistemic privilege of scientists and 
experts, we need to recognize that they are built into the human condition. 
(b) With regard to the epistemological distinction between disinterested and 
interested discourses, Bourdieu’s position can be summarized as follows: truth 
claims are inescapably interest-bearing, because the social conditions underlying 
different modes of knowledge production are ineluctably power-laden. More spe- 
cifically, we can identify five reasons why there is no such thing as disinterested 
knowledge. First, since knowledge is always constructed within a given social con- 
text, it is necessarily normative (Erkenntnisnormativita¨t). Second, given that knowl- 
edge is produced from a specific standpoint in the social space, it is unavoidably 
perspectival (Erkenntnisstandpunkt). Third, insofar as knowledge plays a particu- 
lar——for example, complicit or critical, conservative or subversive, reproductive or 
transformative——role in society, it is inevitably functional (Erkenntnisfunktion). 
Fourth, to the extent that knowledge can be used for different——notably political, 
ideological, scientific and economic——purposes, it is instrumentalizable (Erkennt- 
nisnutzung). Fifth, considering that knowledge is generated by socially competing 
subjects with diverging views of the world, it is in principle always contestable 
(Erkenntniskonkurrenz). In short, epistemic acts (Erkenntnisvollzu¨ge) are inconceiv- 
able without underlying cognitive interests (Erkenntnisinteressen).120 Yet, even if we 
share Bourdieu’s contention that there are no disinterested epistemic discourses, 
we need to admit the fact that his insistence upon the scientificity and objectivity of 
reflexive sociology is not easily reconcilable with his emphasis upon the intrinsic 
partiality and normativity of all linguistic claims to epistemic validity. In other 
words, whilst Bourdieu’s conception of knowledge is based on both objectivist 
realism and normativist constructivism, it is far from obvious to what extent the 
presuppositional tensions between these diametrically opposed epistemological 
frameworks can be resolved. 
(c) The Bourdieusian distinction between legitimate and illegitimate discourses 
is based on the Wittgensteinian insight that different life forms produce different 
language games. From this perspective, legitimate discourses possess, whereas 
 
  
 
illegitimate discourses lack, normative authority in relation to field-specific aspects 
of reality. Whilst Bourdieu’s relational analysis of language is useful in that it 
allows us to account for the fact that all claims to epistemic validity are, directly 
or indirectly, shaped by struggles over social legitimacy, it does not permit us to 
understand why, and to what degree, rational discourses can challenge the spatio- 
temporal determinacy of their own reality. To the extent that linguistic discourses 
are relatively autonomous, they cannot be reduced to epiphenomenal reflections of 
structurally differentiated realities. The rational resources of linguistic communica- 
tion can rise above the social determinants of spatiotemporal framing. To the 
extent that linguistic discourses are interpenetrable, they cannot be reduced to 
self-contained sets of doxic presuppositions. Every discourse is an epistemic 
conglomerate derived from the interaction between numerous social fields. To the 
extent that linguistic discourses are multifunctional, they cannot be reduced to 
monolithic ideologies mobilized in pursuit of one overriding interest. Just as actors 
pursue a variety of interests, discourses serve a multiplicity of functions. In brief, 
the symbolic playfulness of language games is irreducible to the historical 
arbitrariness of life forms. 
(d) With regard to the distinction between instituted and ephemeral discourses, 
Bourdieu has a tendency to emphasize the relationally determined nature and repro- 
ductive function of the former and disregard the relatively unpredictable emergence 
and potentially transformative impact of the latter. If, following Bourdieu, we 
assume that dominant social groups have an interest in consolidating orthodox 
discourses, oriented towards the preservation of their status, and dominated social 
groups have an interest in generating heterodox discourses, oriented towards the 
transformation of their position, then it seems logical to conclude that field- 
specific discourses are largely determined by the underlying social interests that 
shape the actions and reflections of those who produce them. Such a mechanistic 
conception of social reality, however, tends to underestimate the extent to which 
social fields can create an infinite number of language games, whose ideological 
complexity escapes the binary logic of an ideological antagonism between orthodox 
and  heterodox discourses. 
(e) In order to assess the epistemic validity of the distinction between orthodox 
and heterodox discourses, we need to reflect upon the complexity of symbolic rela- 
tions. Every social field can, at least in principle, be shaped by a whole plurality of 
social discourses, whose multifaceted constitution transcends the binary logic of a 
struggle between orthodox and heterodox patterns of action and reflection. Domi- 
nant groups can have heterodox discourses, just as dominated groups can have 
orthodox discourses; relatively powerful actors may endorse patterns of action and 
reflection that challenge the legitimacy of their status quo, whilst relatively disem- 
powered actors may embrace ideological positions that contribute to the reproduc- 
tion of established power relations. In short, polycentric societies produce an 
unlimited amount of competing orthodoxies and heterodoxies that cannot be 
reduced to epiphenomenal reflections of infrastructural antagonisms. 
 
  
 
(6) Bourdieu is correct to insist that there is no comprehensive philosophy of 
language without a critical sociology of symbolic power. The theoretical 
presuppositions that undergird his analysis of the role of legitimacy in the linguistic 
construction of validity are nevertheless problematic in at least five respects. 
First, let us reconsider the assumption that inherent in the legitimacy of lan- 
guage is the legitimacy of representationality. Even if we accept that every Sprach- 
anschauung is a Weltanschauung, we need to identify epistemic criteria that allow 
us to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate, truthful and misleading, 
perceptive and deceptive representations of the world. Bourdieu appears to take a 
convenient middle position between epistemological realism and epistemological con- 
structivism. On the one hand, language equips us with the epistemic capacity to 
represent reality more or less adequately, for without the possibility of descriptive 
and explanatory accuracy there would be no point in making a case for the scienti- 
ficity of reflexive sociology. On the other hand, language makes us represent reality 
in accordance with the socio-historically specific resources borrowed from a partic- 
ular linguistic community, implying that every rational claim to validity is impreg- 
nated with the spatiotemporal contingency of social legitimacy. Paradoxically, 
then, language is both a vehicle for the representation of reality and a tool for the 
construction of a reality of representation. 
Second, let us return to the assumption that inherent in the legitimacy of lan- 
guage is the legitimacy of contextuality. Even if we acknowledge that language 
games are unavoidably embedded in coexistential contexts, it is not always obvious 
which particular set of social relations determines the legitimacy of a speech act in 
a given situation. Due to the simultaneous presence of competing fields in poly- 
centrically organized societies, it is not necessarily evident which particular field 
has the “upper hand” and can impose its idiosyncratic codes of legitimacy on a 
spatiotemporally defined dimension of reality. Just as human actors are simulta- 
neously determined by several social determinants (such as class, ethnicity, gender, 
age and ability), simultaneously influenced by an ensemble of coexistential 
conditions (in particular, sociological, historical, anthropological, psychological and 
biological factors), and simultaneously immersed in different levels of existence 
(micro and macro, ephemeral and institutional, communal and societal), they are 
simultaneously situated in various social fields.121 In short, contextual legitimacy is 
a matter of multidimensional determinacy. 
Third, let us revise the assumption that inherent in the legitimacy of language 
is the legitimacy of capacity. Even if we share the view that the acquirement of lan- 
guage depends on the acquisition of the ability to communicate with other mem- 
bers of a culturally constituted community, it is far from clear to what extent it 
makes sense to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate a linguistic compe- 
tences. Bourdieu is right to assert that the development of linguistic capacity is 
subject to the attainment of linguistic capital, to the formation of a linguistic habi- 
tus and to immersion in a linguistic field. In addition, he justifiably points out that, 
in most linguistic communities, a distinction is drawn between legitimate and ille- 
gitimate——that is, “correct” and “incorrect”, “pure” and “hybrid”, “original” and 
 
  
 
“derivative”, “standard” and “peripheral”——forms of language use. Nonetheless, 
Bourdieu’s notion of linguistic capacity is problematic in that it fails to take seri- 
ously the fact that the social meanings attributed to different forms of language 
use are often blurred and largely subjective. Bourdieu’s field theory allows us to 
account for the contextual contingency of social legitimacy, but it does not permit 
us to grasp the relative arbitrariness underlying both the recognition and the 
misrecognition of linguistic hierarchies. 
Fourth, let us reassess the assumption that inherent in the legitimacy of 
language is the legitimacy of authority. Even if we concede that communicative 
processes oriented towards mutual understanding are often motivated by purposive 
considerations aimed at the attainment of social recognition, we cannot conclude 
that the search for epistemic validity is always and exclusively driven by a struggle 
for social legitimacy. Insofar as the validity of a particular knowledge claim tran- 
scends the relationally defined doxa of a given social field, epistemic authority is a 
matter not of social legitimacy but of rational acceptability. Whilst Bourdieu is 
eager to remind us of the sociological fact that the symbolic authority attributed 
to different claims to validity is largely contingent upon asymmetrically distributed 
resources of social legitimacy, he tends to disregard the epistemological fact that 
the cognitive authority inherent in universally defensible claims to validity derives 
from their rational acceptability. 
Fifth, let us revisit the assumption that inherent in the legitimacy of language 
is the legitimacy of normativity. Even if we presuppose that the power-laden struc- 
turation of society is inconceivable without the interest-bearing regulation of lan- 
guage, we must not reduce the normalization of linguistic relations to a mere 
vehicle for the exercise of symbolic power. There is no doubt that it makes sense 
to reveal the social constructedness of language and thereby expose the validity of 
binary forms of linguistic legitimacy to historical scrutiny. We need to admit, how- 
ever, that the establishment of linguistic norms and conventions may contribute 
not only to the forceful reproduction of power relations but also to the successful 
coordination of social relations. Of course, state-engineered processes of linguistic 
normalization may be considered largely artificial, essentially arbitrary and pro- 
foundly asymmetrical. Yet, they constitute an insufficient but necessary condition 
for the efficient organization of large-scale societies. The standardization of lan- 
guage makes both linguistic communication and action coordination across local, 
regional and often national boundaries possible, thereby contributing to the 
empowering, rather than disempowering, fusion of potentially distant socio-histor- 
ical horizons. The point is not to ignore, let alone deny, the fact that the standard- 
ization, officialization and institutionalization of “national” tongues lead to the 
problematic division between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” forms of language 
use. Rather, the point is to acknowledge that the normalization of language can 
have both disempowering and empowering consequences for both empowered and 
disempowered groups in society. 
 
  
 
(7) One of the most significant features of language is that it is unavoidably 
ideological. Linguistic entities are ideological beings because every language of the 
world (Sprachwelt) creates a particular view of the world (Betrachtungswelt). 
Paradoxically, the Bourdieusian account of the doxic constitution of language is 
situated both within and outside the Marxist project of ideology critique. In accor- 
dance with Marx’s conception of ideology, Bourdieu conceives of doxa as a form 
of everyday false consciousness, which, in its hegemonic variations, tends to serve 
the material reproduction and symbolic legitimation of socially dominant groups. 
In contrast to Marx’s conception of ideology, Bourdieu regards doxa as a relation- 
ally contingent vehicle of symbolic representation, whose claims to ideological uni- 
versality are raised within spatiotemporally confined spaces of legitimacy. From a 
Bourdieusian perspective, then, a Sprachanschauung is not only a Weltanschauung 
but also a Feldanschauung. For Marx, the ruling ideas of a given society are those 
of the ruling class. For Bourdieu, the ruling ideas of a given society are those of 
the dominant group of the ruling field. Thus, whilst Bourdieu’s polycentric 
account of social relations succeeds in avoiding the pitfalls of economic reduction- 
ism, it remains trapped in the explanatory limitations inherent in functionalist 
approaches to symbolic representations. Yet, far from being reducible to a Feld- 
anschauung that is completely determined by the underlying logic of a space of 
possibilities, a Sprachanschauung is a relationally constituted Weltanschauung that 
can create its own realities. 
(8) Another key feature of language is that it is contestable. Surely, Bourdieu is 
right to insist that linguistic struggles represent an integral component of social 
life. The symbolic and material organization of society is inconceivable without the 
emergence of both open and hidden conflicts over the signification and normaliza- 
tion of reality. For this reason, Bourdieu tends to conceive of symbolic relations 
primarily in terms of power relations. The fact that symbolic relations are unavoid- 
ably power-laden, however, does not mean that they are necessarily power-driven. 
In other words, to the extent that symbolic realms are ineluctably impregnated 
with, but not inevitably determined by, power relations, the micro-interactional 
creativity of language games cannot be reduced to the macro-structural functional- 
ity of social struggles. We must not forget that homo sapiens is a homo ludens. The 
playfulness that inhabits various forms of social interaction——such as joking, sing- 
ing, teasing, flirting, dancing and performing——escapes Bourdieu’s agenda of per- 
manent struggle over social positioning and access to resources. A proclivity for 
strategic calculation driven by competition for resources and recognition does not 
linger behind every symbolic interaction. Just as it “is rare that, in ordinary exis- 
tence, language functions as a pure instrument of communication” (Bourdieu 
1982f, 60)122, it is unusual that, in everyday encounters, language serves as a mere 
vehicle of competition. The point is not to deny the forcefulness of symbolic 
power, but to recognize that linguistic beings are equipped with the capacity to 
bypass and, if necessary, challenge the interest-bearing determinacy of society by 
exploiting the potential playfulness of symbolically mediated forms of agency. 
 
  
 
(9) Another key feature of language is that it is commodifiable. From a Bour- 
dieusian perspective, it is the task of a critical sociology of “the economy of sym- 
bolic goods” (Bourdieu 1998a, 9)123 to shed light on “the economy of linguistic 
exchanges” (Bourdieu 1982d). Yet, Bourdieu’s account of linguistic relations is 
paradoxical in that it is both critical of and caught up in the logic of economic 
determinism. On the one hand, Bourdieu is wary of the economic reductionism 
inherent in rational choice theories, which fail to account for the social conditions 
of production124, and he condemns the detrimental consequences of market-driven 
societies, which manifest themselves in processes of stigmatization and marginali- 
zation (see Bourdieu 1993a and Bourdieu 1998b). On the other hand, Bourdieu 
paints an economistic picture of reality, suggesting that social life is driven by a 
permanent struggle over material and symbolic resources, which are acquired 
through the attainment of legitimate forms of capital within competitively struc- 
tured fields. Hence, Bourdieu conceives of linguistic encounters as symbolic 
exchanges, linguistic fields as symbolic economies, linguistic competences as stocks 
of symbolic capital and linguistic habitus as the practical ability to struggle over 
symbolic resources. Such an economistic perspective, however, disregards the fact 
that language constitutes a species-constitutive capacity that allows human beings 
to raise themselves out of nature by developing a sense of autonomy and responsi- 
bility through their meaning-laden structuration of reality and communicative 
organization of society. If our hermeneutic capacity to develop a meaningful rela- 
tion to the world by virtue of language were reducible to the practical ability to 
compete for resources in an economy of symbolic goods, our species-constitutive 
need to attribute existential significance to reality would be reduced to an acciden- 
tal commodity of a market-driven society. 
(10) According to Bourdieu, language is both a source and a medium of sym- 
bolic power. As argued above, however, the assumption that linguistic realms are 
not only impregnated with but also largely determined by power relations is based 
on a form of socio-ontological fatalism that leaves little, if any, room for exploring 
the civilizational functions inherent in the universally empowering potentials of 
language. In fact, conceiving of rapports sociaux primarily as rapports de force, 
rather than as rapports normatifs, prevents us from grasping the emancipatory role 
of species-constitutive resources, notably the civilizational accomplishments of our 
critical, judgmental and moral capacities. Social relations would be unsustainable if 
they were based exclusively on power relations, and social actions would under- 
mine the very possibility of human coexistence if they were not only permeated 
but also driven, primarily, by struggles over the acquisition of material and sym- 
bolic resources. To be sure, the point is not to replace Bourdieu’s relational 
account of the “real speech situation” with Habermas’s paradisal view of the “ideal 
speech situation”. Rather, the point is to recognize that just as we need to reject 
Habermas’s socio-ontological romanticism, which portrays the lifeworld as a 
power-free realm of pristine intersubjectivity, we need to discard Bourdieu’s 
socio-ontological fatalism, which suggests that human actions are ultimately driven 
 
  
 
by competitive struggles over power and legitimacy. By contrast, embracing a posi- 
tion of socio-ontological realism permits us to face up to the simultaneous existence 
of the power-laden and the power-critical elements of social life. Most real speech 
situations are constituted by competent speakers who, whilst having an interest in 
gaining access to material and symbolic resources, are able to mobilize the 
empowering potential of their communicative capacity and thereby contribute to 
the construction of a better society. 
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symboliques”. 
[85] My translation; original text in French: “relation de communication entre un e´ metteur 
(chiffrement) et un re´ cepteur (de´  chiffrement)”. 
[86] My translation; original text in French: “e´ change linguistique”. 
[87] Cf. Bourdieu (2002b, 351): “les revendications de validite´ [validity claims] devant 
s’affronter a`    des revendications concurrentes […] pour obtenir la reconnaissance […]”. 
[88] My translation; original text in French: “[a]nalyse […] de l’e´ conomie des biens 
symboliques” (already referred to above). 
[89] My translation; original text in French: “communaute´ linguistique”. 
[90]  My translation; original text in French: “un «groupe de gens qui utilisent le meˆme sys- te` 
me de signes linguistiques»”. 
[91] My translation; original text in French: “la condition”. 
[92] My translation; original text in French: “de la production e´ conomique”. 
[93] My translation; original text in French: “de la domination symbolique”. 
[94] My translation (text slightly modified in the English translation); original text in French: 
“l’espace […] de´ finit la langue”. 
[95] My translation; original text in French: “la langue […] de´ finit son espace”. 
[96] My translation; original text in French: “[l]’unification du champ linguistique”. 
[97]  My translation; original text in French: “l’imposition de le´ gitimite´”. 
[98] My translation; original text in French: “la valeur sociale de la compe  ´tence linguistique”. 
[99] On Bourdieu’s notion of “interconvertibility” see, for example, Bourdieu ([1972] 1977, 178). 
[100] On Bourdieu’s conception of symbolic power, see, for example: Bourdieu (1977); Bour- 
dieu ([1977] 1992); Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992d). See also, for example: Addi (2001); 
Cicourel (2004); Hallett (2003); Honneth (1984); Jurt (2004); Kraemer (2002); Leneveu 
(2002); Loos (2000); Mauger (2005); Peter (2004); Schubert (2002); Terray (2003); 
Wacquant ([1993] 2002). 
[101] My translation; original text in French: “Relation entre un e´ metteur et un re´ cepteur 
[…]”. 
[102] My translation; original text in French: “l’e´ change linguistique”. 
[103] My translation; original text in French: “communaute´ linguistique”. 
[104] My translation (already referred to above). 
[105] My translation; original text in French: “La violence symbolique est en effet cette forme 
de domination qui, de´ passant l’opposition que l’on fait commune  ´ment entre les rapports 
de sens et les rapports de force, entre la communication et la domination, ne s’accomplit 
qu’au travers de la communication sous laquelle elle se dissimule”. 
 
  
 
[106] My translation; original text in French: “[…] a` imposer la ve´ rite  ´partielle d’un groupe 
comme la ve´ rite  ´des relations objectives entre les groupes”. 
[107] My translation; original text in French: “le processus de conse  ´cration-universalisation”. 
[108] Cf. Bourdieu and Boltanski (1975, 8): “la valeur qui lui est reconnue”. 
[109]  Literal translation from German into English: “sociability”. 
[110] Literal translation from German into English: “balance of power” or “strength-relativity”. 
[111] Literal translation from French into English: “relations of power” or “relations of force”. 
[112] Cf. Bourdieu (2002b, 351): “les revendications de validite´ [validity claims] devant 
s’affronter a` des revendications concurrentes […] pour obtenir la reconnaissance […]”. 
[113] My translation; original text in French: “la domination […] toujours une dimension 
symbolique”. 
[114] On Bourdieu’s notion of complicity, see, for example, Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992d, 
167). 
[115] My translation; original text in French: “[…] violence douce, insensible, invisible pour 
ses victimes meˆmes, qui s’exerce pour l’essentiel par les voies purement symboliques de la 
communication et de la connaissance ou, plus pre´  cise  ´ment, de la me´ connaissance, de la 
reconnaissance ou, a`  la limite, du sentiment”. 
[116] My translation; original text in French: “les domine´ s contribuent a` leur propre 
domination”. 
[117] My translation; original text in French: “Il n’y a pas de pouvoir symbolique sans une 
symbolique du pouvoir”. 
[118] On this point, cf. Susen (2010b, 64–6 and 76–8). On the relevance of the relationship 
between commonality and singularity to the analysis of culture, see, for instance, Susen 
(2011c, 182–4, 190–2 and 197). 
[119]  See also Bourdieu (1982f, 72). Cf. Ko¨gler (2011, 284) and Susen (2007, 240). 
[120] Cf. Susen (2007, 164–5). On this point, see also Susen (2011a), Susen (2011b) and Susen 
(2012). 
[121] In order to illustrate this point, it may be useful to introduce a typology that 
distinguishes between “foundational fields”, “contingent fields” and “ephemeral    fields”. 
(i) A foundational field constitutes a civilizational ensemble of relationally structured con- 
ditions the existence of which is necessary for the emergence of social order. (ii) A contin- 
gent field represents a societal ensemble of relationally structured conditions the existence 
of which is possible within the emergence of social order. (iii) An ephemeral field stands 
for an interactional ensemble of relationally structured conditions the existence of which 
is largely irrelevant to the emergence of social order. (i) The most obvious examples of 
foundational fields are economic, political, cultural, artistic, linguistic and sexual fields, 
because no society can possibly exist without some degree of division of labour, small- 
scale and large-scale modes of action coordination, various forms of habitualization, 
diversified realms of aesthetic expression, everyday spaces of communicative interaction, 
and overt or subtle ways of regulating sexual reproduction. (ii) Contemporary examples 
of contingent fields are judicial, military, religious, scientific, academic and journalistic 
fields, because society may be organized more or less efficiently with, but can——at least 
in principle——exist without, legal arrangements, martial resources, sacred institutions, 
systematic forms of knowledge production, disciplinary divisions of cognition and media 
industries. (iii) Obvious examples of ephemeral fields are short-lived gatherings, political 
demonstrations, concerts, stage performances, parties, sport events, football matches, train 
journeys, lectures, seminars and classes; in short, an infinite list of collectively constructed 
situations and shared experiences. 
[122] My translation (already referred to above). 
[123] My translation; original text in French: “l’e´ conomie des biens symboliques”. 
 
  
 
[124] On the Bourdieusian critique of rational choice theories and rational actor theories, see, 
for example, Bourdieu ([2000] 2005, esp. 1–17 and 209–22). 
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